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Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We 
concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks which allows us to explore the 
impact of interbank lending when exposures are long-term and interbank borrowers are small banks. 
The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank 
exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy makers have shown considerable interest in market discipline as a supplement to bank 
regulation. The idea is that regulators can use market signals to identify banks which the 
market perceives as riskier (Berger, 1991).1 Most of the “market discipline” literature has 
concentrated on using traded subordinated debt and equity pricing as a market discipline tool 
(Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Sironi, 2002; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; and Ashcraft, forthcoming). 
In this paper we take another approach in concentrating on interbank borrowing as a signal of 
risk.  
Interbank exposures have often been viewed in the literature as a source of contagion (Allen 
and Gale, 2000 and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) and, therefore, as a factor enhancing 
systemic risk. However, Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue that, by generating incentives for 
lending banks to monitor interbank-borrowing banks, interbank exposures may also 
contribute to prudent market behavior and reduce the risk of bank failures and systemic 
distress. The idea is that banks are particularly good at identifying the risks of other banks 
(Calomiris, 1998). Provided with proper incentives, they can perform a complementary task 
to bank regulation and supervision by the authorities. 
Despite the obvious appeal of this idea, empirical research on the issue is limited. In a first 
step in this direction, Furfine (2001) examines the pricing of interbank lending agreements as 
an indicator of the ability of banks to monitor their interbank borrowers. Since interbank loans 
in the federal funds market are large and uncollateralized, they expose lending institutions to 
significant credit risk. Lending banks, therefore, have an incentive to monitor their 
counterparties and price these loans as a function of the credit risk of the borrowing bank.2 
Furfine’s empirical results support this hypothesis by showing that borrowing banks with 
higher profitability, higher capital ratios, and fewer problem loans pay lower interest on 
                                               
1
 See Flannery and Nikolova (2004) for a detailed overview of the market discipline literature. 
2
 In a strict sense Furfine (2001) studies screening of the borrowing banks’ risk (prior to the lending) rather than 
monitoring by the lending banks. 
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federal fund loans than others. However, the impact is fairly small; for example, a one 
standard deviation rise in the loan-to-capital ratio raises the interest rate by merely 1.5 basis 
points. In a more recent paper, King (forthcoming) also finds that high-risk banks pay higher 
interest on federal funds. He shows, in addition, that more risky banks will borrow less in the 
federal funds market. Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006) point to the fact that the studies focusing 
on the correlation of prices with risk may confound supply and demand effects. To 
disentangle supply and demand effects they use exogenous shocks to a bank’s liquidity 
position to trace out the credit supply curve. Using this approach, they document only weak 
evidence of the existence of market discipline. 
A potential reason for the small economic significance of the results and the low empirical 
research interest in the issue is that the economic analysis of interbank exposures has so far 
concentrated on highly developed banking markets, where interbank exposures are mostly 
generated by short-term liquidity needs (as modeled by Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). As 
pointed out by Rochet and Tirole (1996), short-term interbank exposures might not be 
effective disciplinary tools since they can quickly be abandoned by both the borrowing and 
the lending banks. Furthermore, in an environment where interbank borrowers are large 
institutions the disciplining role of interbank borrowing may be hampered by too-big-to-fail 
concerns, since the interbank lenders anticipate potential bail-outs of the large interbank 
borrowers.  
Our purpose in this paper is to document that interbank borrowing is associated with lower 
risk-taking of borrowing banks. This phenomenon would be consistent with the market 
discipline hypotheses and with some type of monitoring role performed by the lending banks. 
To empirically test this hypothesis we employ data from a sample of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, where interbank trade is the result of long-term specialization of 
incumbent banks in issuing deposits and of new entrant banks in lending to nonbanks. We 
define banking systems with such a structure as two-tier banking systems. Two-tier banking 
systems present two advantages for the analysis of the risk alleviating role of interbank 
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borrowing. First, in this environment, interbank lending is characterized by longer maturities 
than those common in the US, where interbank loans are usually overnight.3 Second, 
interbank borrowing banks are typically small institutions. Therefore, in this context the too-
big-to-fail doctrine does not apply for the interbank borrowers and interbank lenders are likely 
to react to the observed risk of the borrowing bank without counting on being bailed out.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the emergence and the 
characteristics of the two-tier banking systems in CEE countries. Section 3 presents a short 
discussion on the relationship between interbank borrowing and bank risk. Section 4 
introduces the data sources. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and section 6 concludes. 
2. Bank specialization and interbank borrowing in CEE 
We consider banks from ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries with a common 
past of planned economies. Before we proceed with the empirical analysis, we will present a 
short overview of the CEE banking market developments which led to the emergence of two-
tier banking structures in some of these countries.  
The two-tier banking system structure is characterized by high volumes of interbank 
borrowing from the largest banks, which dominate the deposit markets, by the smaller banks, 
which together dominate the market for loans to nonbanks. It emerged only in some of the 
sample countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). In other sample countries 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia) new entrant banks dominate both the 
deposit and the loan market and we observe a classical banking system structure with banks 
active in both the deposit and the loan market. We include banks from countries with classical 
banking system structures in order to control for other transition specific effects. 
                                               
3
 Although the role of specialization as a cause of interbank trade has not yet been studied thoroughly, some 
studies indicate that it is a valid explanation for the very high intensity of interbank trade in countries with 
relatively underdeveloped financial systems. See e.g.  Galmes and Manzano (1995) for the Spanish banking 
system, Cole and Slade (1996) for Indonesia, and Bonin et al (1998) for several Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) transition economies. 
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The emergence of the two-tier systems was mainly a result of the design of banking system 
reforms. It emerged in those countries where governments were unwilling to let incumbent 
banks fail and undertook massive and repeated recapitalization programs. In the early 
transition period no explicit deposit insurance schemes existed, but the repeated 
recapitalization of the incumbent banks provided an implicit deposit guarantee on 
incumbents’ deposits. At the same time, small new entrants were allowed to fail4. In the 
meantime the pool of borrowers rapidly changed in these economies, with the share of small 
and medium-sized enterprises constantly increasing. The new banks seemed to be better 
suited to lend to the small private businesses than the large incumbent banks.5 As a result, the 
new entrant banks had a large demand for loans but insufficient customer deposits to finance 
them, while the incumbents held customer deposits in excess of loan commitments. This was 
the pattern of banking system transition in Bulgaria (only in the early transition period), the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In Hungary, for example, the largest 
incumbent bank, OTP, held 55% of all deposits in 1994 but only 31% of all loans. By 2004 
the figures had changed to 26% of all deposits and 16% of all loans. Similarly, in the Czech 
Republic, Sporitelna Banka held 39% of all deposits in 1994 but only 18% of all loans; by 
2004 the deposit market share of Sporitelna Banka had declined to 26%, while its loan market 
share stayed almost constant at 20%. 
A different scenario developed in the Baltic countries, where the incumbents, inherited from 
the Soviet era, were Baltic branches of Soviet banks. Some of these banks were partially 
acquired by private Russian enterprises as their parent banks went through an ownership 
transformation. This gave the governments of the newly independent countries an easier 
political platform to liquidate the troubled banks instead of recapitalizing them (Bonin et al, 
1998). With no incumbents to protect, banking system development started from scratch after 
                                               
4
 Explicit deposit insurance schemes covering all banks were introduced in all CEE countries only in the late 
1990s. Deposits are insured up to certain thresholds which vary across the countries between 2500 and 20000 
Euro (Nenovsky and Dimitrova, 2003). However, the credibility of these new schemes has not yet been tested as 
no formal bank failure has occurred since then. 
5
 The fact that small banks have competitive advantages in serving small borrowers has been well established in 
the banking literature (Stein, 2002 and Berger et al, 2005). 
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the wide-spread banking crisis in the Baltics of 1994-95. New institutions, mostly subsidiaries 
of foreign banks (e.g. Hansa bank), emerged and quickly acquired large market shares in both 
the deposit and the loan market.  
To illustrate the features of the two-tier banking systems we construct two variables which 
measure the transfer of funds from institutions dominating the deposit market to the rest of the 
banks. First, we define as large those banks that, in a given year and country, have a market 
share of at least 20% in the market for customer deposits. The rest of the banks in each 
country are defined as small. We then measure the transfer of funds by two ratios: the ratio of 
large banks’ net interbank assets to customer deposits (NIAlb/CDlb) and the ratio of small 
banks’ net interbank position to their loans (NIAsb/Lsb). 6 Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the values 
of these ratios for each of the sample countries. As the data in these tables illustrate, up to 
50% of the deposits of the largest banks in the Czech Republic were channeled through the 
interbank market. For Hungary, Poland and Slovakia that number is about 20%.7 Small banks 
in these countries financed up to 20-30% of their loans through interbank borrowing. It is 
important to notice here that a very large share of the interbank exposures were with a 
maturity of over 3 months.8  
                                               
6
 Alternatively as a robustness check we have tried a “large” bank identification methodology based on the 
number of banks in the respective country. We define as “large” the 5% largest (in terms of customer deposits) 
banks in a country (so countries with up to 20 banks have 1 “large bank, in countries with up to 40 banks we 
define 2 “large” banks and in such with up to 60 bank we define 3 “large” banks. The use of this alternative 
definition of “large” banks only slightly changes the values of the transfer of funds variables (NIA_SB and 
NIA_LB). The results of the regressions do not change qualitatively either. We also tried defining the 10% 
largest (in terms of customer deposits) banks in a country as “large” banks. In this case, however, we encounter 
the problem of dealing with a too unstable sample of “large” banks. In the case of Poland, for example, we have 
to identify in each of the years 1995-2004 the 6 largest banks in terms of customer deposits. Whereas the sample 
of the top two banks stays unchanged throughout the period (PKO BP, and Bank Pekao), different banks occupy 
the third to sixth place in different years, with banks like Bank Handlowy w Warszawie and Bank Millenium 
repeatedly exiting and entering the “large” banks sample. We choose not to pursue this approach of identifying 
the large banks since we want to concentrate on a stable sample.  
7
 As indicated by the negative values in Table 2 large banks in one-tier systems are often net borrowers of 
interbank funds, similarly the positive values in Table 3 indicate that one-tier systems’ small banks are often net 
interbank lenders. 
8
 Bonin et al (1998) 
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3. Interbank borrowing and bank risk 
The incumbent banks in two-tier banking systems have well established deposit gathering 
networks and in addition enjoy implicit government deposit guarantees. As a result, they are 
able to accumulate retail deposits at lower costs than the new entrants, which lack a developed 
deposit gathering network and government protection. They can, therefore, provide interbank 
loans to these new entrant banks at interest rates lower than the rates the new entrants would 
have to pay in the deposit market.9 New entrants that do not borrow from the incumbents have 
to offer substantially higher deposit rates than the incumbents not only as a risk premium but 
also to compensate their customers for any switching costs and the inconveniencies resulting 
from the worse geographical coverage.  
The two-tier banking systems described above provide a good setting for testing the 
hypothesis that interbank borrowers are less risky. The empirical analysis that follows focuses 
on the question whether the loan portfolios of interbank-borrowing banks are characterized by 
lower levels of risk than banks which do not borrow in the interbank market. We address this 
issue by regressing different measures of bank risk on a measure of a bank’s interbank 
borrowing position. Since interbank borrowing may be endogenous with respect to bank risk, 
we present alternative identification approaches based on instrumental variables. 
Finding, as we do below, that banks that depend on interbank borrowing have systematically 
lower risk levels is consistent with a market-discipline argument. The same empirical finding 
could arise, however, if the lending banks were risk averse and lent only to banks whose risk 
levels happen to be relatively low. Nevertheless, such a portfolio selection effect still requires 
that the lending banks have information about the borrowing banks. If such information is not 
available publicly, the lending banks, as in the market-discipline argument, would have to 
invest in information about the borrowing banks, and their actions can therefore be 
informative to regulators. 
                                               
9
 In Dinger and von Hagen (2005) we explicitly model why incumbents prefer extending interbank loans to 
operating in the credit market.  
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4. Data  
We match data from the following sources. Macro level variables are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM issues by the IMF. Micro level data are obtained 
from banks’ financial statements provided by BankScope.10 Our sample includes 296 banks, 
of which 28 are Bulgarian, 35 Czech, 12 Estonian, 36 Hungarian, 28 Latvian, 14 Lithuanian, 
56 Polish, 34 Romanian, 24 Slovakian, and 29 Slovenian. In each of the sample countries, 
BankScope covers 70-90% of the banks calculated as percentage of banking assets. We have 
restricted the analysis to the period of 1995-2004. We avoid the use of data from the 
restructuring and recapitalizing period 1990-1994 which are quite noisy. Data for some of the 
banks are available for only some of the years, which results in an unbalanced panel dataset. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of some key variables. 
We perform the regressions on a sample consisting only of the banks that are regarded as 
small by the construction of the transfer of funds variables, since the creditors of large banks 
may be less concerned with their borrowers risk because of too-big-to-fail considerations. 
However, results do not qualitatively change if the estimations are performed using the full 
sample of banks. 
5. Comparison of banks’ risk characteristics: empirical evidence 
In this section we provide an empirical test of the relation between interbank borrowing and 
bank risk.   
Our primary interest is in estimating an equation of the following form: 
ijttjjtijtijtijt TCYXIPBR εββββββ ++++++= ***** 654321 ,    (1) 
where ijtBR  denotes a measure of the risk incurred by bank i in country j at time t, ijtIP  is the 
interbank position of bank i in country j in time t, ijtX  is a vector of control variables at the 
                                               
10
 BankScope is a database created by IBCA and Bureau van Dijk. 
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level of the individual bank, jtY  is a vector of control variables at the level of country of 
operations, jC  and tT are vectors of country and year dummies, and ijtε is the error term.  
To measure the riskiness of a bank’s business11 we use three variables that have been widely 
used in the literature: loan-loss reserves to gross loans (LLR), loan-loss provisions to gross 
loans (LLP) and the ratio of net charge-offs to equity (NCO).12,13 
To measure the impact of interbank borrowing on bank risk, we include as an explanatory 
variable the net interbank position of a bank measured by the ratio of net interbank assets to 
total assets (NIA/TA).14 If this ratio has negative values, the bank is a net borrower in the 
interbank market. Positive values of the ratio indicate that the bank is a net provider of 
interbank funds.15  
Several control variables are included in the estimation. At the individual bank level, we 
introduce bank size, capitalization level, and foreign ownership as control variables. We 
represent a bank’s size by the logarithm of total assets. In addition, we use the squared bank 
size term to allow for a non-linear form of the dependence between bank size and risk 
undertaking. Capitalization is measured by the ratio of equity to total assets. Foreign 
ownership is captured by a dummy variable equal to one if at least 50% of a bank’s equity is 
owned by an institution based abroad and to 0 otherwise. We include this variable to account 
for the possibility that foreign-owned banks have a better technology for assessment of credit 
worthiness and are thus less likely to generate non-performing loans.  
                                               
11
 See Martin (1977) and Gonzales-Hermosillo, et al (1996). 
12
 The use of more sophisticated market based measures of bank risk, e.g. interest rate on certificates of deposits, 
bank bond prices, etc., is not possible for the sample of CEE banks since such instruments were not used in most 
of the CEE countries during the period we study.  
13
 All three risk measures are in logarithmic form. 
14
 We use the continuous variable instead of an “interbank borrowing” dummy to control for the fact that 
monitoring incentives of the lender are increasing with the amount of interbank borrowing (as discussed in 
Section 3). 
15
 As a robustness check we have performed the estimation using the ratio of a bank’s interbank liabilities to total 
assets as a proxy for a bank’s interbank position. The results (which are available from the authors upon request) 
do not differ qualitatively from the results using the net interbank assets to total assets ratio.  
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At the country level we include the following macroeconomic variables as controls: inflation, 
per capita GDP, and the growth rate of GDP. Inflation is defined as the percentage change in 
the GDP deflator. Per capita GDP is used as a general index of economic development and is 
measured in thousands of US dollars. GDP growth is used to measure cyclical effects on bank 
risk and is measured as the percentage growth rate of real per capita GDP. In addition we 
include the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal “Index of Economic Freedom” 
(economic freedom) as a control. The index comprises various indicators of economic 
development such as government intervention in the economy, property rights, financial 
system development, etc. Time and country fixed effects are introduced in the regressions to 
capture other unobserved variables such as the quality of governance, the amount of 
corruption, etc. 
As pointed out in section 3, interbank borrowing may be endogenous with respect to bank 
risk, e.g. if lending banks price risk or ration more risky banks. To deal with this possibility 
we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in order to empirically test for potential 
endogeneity.16 The results of the test confirm the existence of endogeneity. In this case simple 
panel OLS regressions will be biased and inconsistent.  
In order to deal with the endogeneity of the interbank position we adopt an instrumental 
variables approach. An effective instrument for the net interbank position of a bank should be 
closely correlated with a bank’s incentives to borrow in the interbank market but not 
simultaneously correlated with the bank’s risk. We choose the ratio of a bank’s retail deposits 
to its total loans (deposits/loans) as an instrument for its net interbank position.17 The retail-
deposits to loans ratio is closely correlated with the bank’s net interbank position, because in 
the sample countries a major determinant of interbank borrowing is the lack of well developed 
                                               
16
 See Davidson and McKinnon (1993) for a description of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. We 
perform this test for all three specifications of the dependent variable. In each specification the endogeneity of 
the net interbank position was confirmed.   
17
 Deposits/loans is a demand side instrument: the deposits/loans ratio is correlated with a bank’s demand for 
interbank loans. An interesting robustness check would have been the inclusion of supply side instruments. Our 
dataset, however, does not provide us such instruments that are correlated with the supply for interbank loans 
faced by a bank but not with its risk.  
 11 
retail networks. If banks lack a wide-spread deposit gathering networks, they bear higher 
costs of deposit gathering and have stringer incentives to demand interbank financing. For 
banks with developed deposit gathering networks the incentives to borrow in the interbank 
market are weaker, because the cost advantage of interbank financing as compared to retail 
deposits is smaller.18 
Moreover, we argue that the deposits-to-loans ratio is exogenous with regard to bank risk. 
Although it could be argued (as in Billet, Garfinkel and O’Neal, 1998) that a riskier bank can 
shift liabilities from uninsured wholesale funds to insured retail deposits, we consider such a 
shift extremely unlikely in the short-run due to the absence of sufficient deposit gathering 
networks. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we also present the results of the estimations 
when the lagged-retail-deposit-to-loans ratio (lagged deposits/lagged loans) is used as an 
instrument.19  
We apply a two-stage instrumental variable panel data estimator20 to estimate the impact of 
the interbank position on the three measures of banks risk using the deposits to loans ratio as 
an instrument. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.  
The coefficients of the net interbank position in all regression specifications are positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, interbank borrowing, which implies negative net interbank 
assets, is associated with a lower level of risk taking. Banks borrowing on the interbank 
market have on average lower LLR, LLP and NCO ratios than banks which do not borrow in 
the interbank market. Moreover, results are economically significant. For example, a change 
in the interbank position (NIA/TA) from zero to minus 0.1 is associated with a drop in the 
ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans of almost 48%. Similarly, the ratio of loan loss 
                                               
18
 The so called Stock and Watson rule of thumb (Stock and Watson, 2003) is often used as a proxy for the 
strength of an instrument. According to this rule the first stage F-statistics testing the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero should be at least 10. In the case of the regression presented in 
Table 5 we have a F-statistics of 19.5 for the deposits/loans instrument.  
19
 In this case the F-statistics for the Stock and Watson rule of thumb is 15.4 
20
 We use the STATA two-stage GLS estimator with adjusted standard errors. 
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provisions to gross loans drops by 48% and the ratio of net charge-offs to equity drops by 
51%.  
Control variables 
Bank size and bank size squared are both significant in all regression specifications. The 
coefficients suggest a nonlinear (U-shaped) relation between bank size and risk. Equity to 
total assets has a significant negative impact on the risk measures, which is consistent with 
the theoretical notion that banks with higher proportion of own capital invest in less risky 
projects. The foreign ownership dummy has significant negative coefficients in all regression 
specifications, presenting evidence for lower levels of risk undertaking by banks owned by 
foreign entities. This result supports similar findings in the literature on foreign bank entry in 
transition and developing countries (Clarke et al, 2003). 
Concerning the macroeconomic variables, inflation does not have a significant impact on risk; 
per capita GDP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the LLP regression 
and a negative coefficient in the NCO regression. GDP growth significantly reduces bank risk 
as measured by LLR and LLP, indicating the cyclical impact on bank risk. The economic 
freedom index (which is decreasing with economic liberalization) enters the LLR and LLP 
regression specifications with a positive significant coefficient indicating that banks in less 
economically developed countries have riskier loan portfolios. 
Robustness checks and alternative specifications 
In this section we examine the robustness of the baseline instrumental variable estimation 
presented above by estimating alternative specifications of the instrumental variables. We 
start by replacing the deposits to loans ratio by the lagged deposits to loans ratio as an 
instrument. This specification addresses the potential critique that the deposits to loans ratio 
may not be exogenous if small banks are able to quickly shift their liabilities from the 
interbank to the retail deposit market. The results of this specification are presented in Table 
6a. In addition we estimate the model by including both the deposit to loans ratio and the 
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lagged deposits to lagged loans ratio as an instrument. In this case the number of instruments 
exceeds the number of endogenous variables and an overidentification restrictions test allows 
us to check the exogeneity of the instruments21. The results of these regression specifications 
are presented in Table 6b. 
Alternatively, we include the deposits to loans ratio, the net interbank assets of large banks, 
the net interbank assets of small banks (for each country and year) and their interaction with 
the deposits to loans ratio as instruments. In this specification we enrich the set of instruments 
by inclusion of the banking system structure. The intuition is that the features of the banking 
system might influence the demand for interbank funds. So, for example, small banks 
operating in two-tier systems may anticipate that interbank borrowing is easier for low risk 
banks and adjust their risk levels accordingly. The results are presented in Table 6c.22  
A comparison between the results in Tables 6a to 6c shows that results are robust to changes 
in the instrument specification. For all regression specifications we are able to document 
lower risk of the interbank borrowing banks.     
6. Conclusion 
Existing empirical research on the relationship between interbank borrowing and bank risk is 
very limited and has found only marginal effects (Furfine, 2001; Ashcraft and Bleakley, 
2006). One possible explanation is that interbank exposures in the countries which have been 
the focus of previous studies are with very short-term maturity (overnight). In addition the 
interbank borrowing banks in developed financial systems (and the US in particular) are the 
largest banks so that too-big-to-fail considerations reduce the lenders’ incentives to control for 
borrower’s risk.  
                                               
21
 Deposits/loans and lagged deposits/lagged loans pass the overidentification restriction tests for all three 
dependent variables. The values of the χ2 statistics for the Sargan-Hansen tests are 0.068, 0.533 and 1.605 for 
LLR, LLP and NCO, which correspond to p-values of 0.79, 0.46 and 0.21, respectively. 
22
 The overidentification reestriction tests are again passed in all but the LLP regression specifications. The 
values of the χ2 statistics for the Sargan-Hansen tests are 4.747, 8.838 and 1.911 for LLR, LLP and NCO and 
correspond to p-values of 0.18, 0.03 and 0.59, respectively. 
 14 
In this paper, we use a novel dataset characterized by long-term interbank exposures and 
small size of the interbank borrowing banks to shed new light on the issue. We estimate the 
relationship between interbank borrowing and bank risk using a set of instrumental variables 
to control for the potential endogeneity of the interbank position with respect to the risk of a 
bank. Our results show that interbank borrowing is associated with substantially lower risk 
taking by the borrowing banks. These results are consistent with monitoring by the lending 
banks.  
 15 
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Table 1: Deposit market shares of major CEE banks 
Customer deposit market share in:
Country Bank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Ceska Sporitelna 32% 26% 26% 26% 28% 29% 26% 25% 27% 29%
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka 9% 8% 10% 9% 11% 28% 28% 26% 27% 28%
Komercni Banka 25% 23% 24% 20% 22% 23% 22% 21% 22% 24%
Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 8% 9%
K&H Bank 9% 9% 9% 10% 14% 14% 14% 11% 10% 12%
OTP 49% 44% 39% 40% 34% 30% 31% 30% 31% 30%
Bank Pekao 13% 15% 15% 12% 13% 13% 15% 14% 15% 15%
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy PBK 6% 5% 7% 8% 10% 11% 13% 12% 11% 11%
PKO BP 32% 30% 27% 34% 25% 28% 28% 28% 28% 25%
Slovak Savings Bank 46% 43% 41% 36% 34% 32% 31% 30% 28% 29%
Tatra Bank 5% 7% 7% 7% 9% 12% 15% 16% 15% 15%
Vseobecna Uverova Banka 32% 30% 29% 26% 26% 25% 25% 25% 26% 25%
BULBANK 12% 24% 28% 20% 27% 29% 30% 25% 22% 22%
DSK 37% 24% 30% 28% 26% 25% 25% 23% 20% 20%
United Bulgarian Bank 9% 6% 11% 10% 13% 15% 17% 15% 15% 13%
Estonian Savings Bank 28% 23% 19% - - - - acquired by HansaBank
Eesti Uhispank 20% 22% 21% 29% 27% 23% 24% 22% 20% 20%
HansaBank 28% 32% 29% 60% 64% 68% 68% 70% 71% 71%
Hansabanka 8% 12% 17% 20% 22% 22% 24% 21% 20% 20%
Latvijas Unibanka 25% 24% 24% 34% 31% 28% 25% 19% 18% 19%
Parekss Banka 22% 24% 24% 34% 37% 33% 28% 23% 24% 26%
AB Bankas Hansa 26% 24% 30% 39% 43% 33% 33% 33% 34% 34%
Commercial Bank of Lithuania 24% 20% - - - - - - liquidated
Vilniaus Bankas 7% 15% 21% 21% 29% 41% 41% 42% 42% 43%
Banca Comerciala Romana 12% 12% 13% 28% 34% 29% 35% 34% 33% 33%
BANCOREX 66% 71% 54% 23% - acquired by Banca Comerciala Romana
Romanian Savings Bank 8% 10% 11% 13% 14% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor 18% 13% 10% 16% 16% 18% 16% 15% 15% 15%
Nova Ljubljanska Banka 21% 20% 21% 46% 45% 48% 47% 46% 43% 42%
SKB Banka DD 10% 10% 9% 14% 13% 14% 14% 12% 11% 11%
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Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope  
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Table 2: Large banks’ interbank position 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.34 0.53 0.51 0.45 0.30 0.30
Hungary 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.15
Poland 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.17
Slovakia 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.33 0.10 0.19
Bulgaria 0.17 -0.50 0.29 0.47 0.44 0.66 0.49 0.42 0.36 0.33
Estonia 0.20 0.00 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
Latvia 0.12 0.13 0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 -0.17
Lithuania 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.09 -0.13 -0.29 -0.20
Romania 0.35 -0.27 -0.61 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.14
Slovenia 0.26 0.24 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.33 0.27
tw
o-
tie
r 
ba
n
ki
n
g 
sy
st
em
s
o
th
er
 
ba
n
ki
n
g 
sy
st
em
s
 
Note: Large banks interbank position is computed as the ratio: 
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, 
)3,1(∈n depending on country and year, where iLBIA_  denotes the amount of interbank assets of i-th large 
bank in the respective country and year; iLBIL _  denotes the interbank liabilities of this bank and iLBCD _  
denotes the amount of  its customer deposits.  
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope  
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Table 3: Small banks’ interbank position 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic -0.33 -0.31 -0.22 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.05
Hungary -0.26 -0.17 -0.25 -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 -0.19
Poland -0.11 -0.19 -0.08 -0.19 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.07
Slovakia -0.34 -0.29 -0.36 -0.30 -0.32 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14
Bulgaria -0.24 1.60 1.03 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.66 0.27 0.13 0.10
Estonia 0.10 0.03 -0.16 -0.25 -0.09 0.22 0.07 -0.58 -0.61 -0.20
Latvia 1.10 1.56 1.02 0.16 0.38 1.08 0.83 1.02 0.72 0.65
Lithuania -0.17 0.04 0.27 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.19 -0.19 -0.13
Romania 0.18 0.11 0.52 0.33 0.32 0.03 0.37 0.12 -0.08 -0.12
Slovenia 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.17 -0.17
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Note: Small banks interbank position is computed as the ratio: 
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, 
)47,4(∈m where jSBIA_  denotes the amount of interbank assets of j-th small bank in the respective 
country and year; jSBIL _  denotes the interbank liabilities of this bank and jSBL _  denotes the amount of  
its loans to non-financial institutions. 
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope  
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Table 4: Summary statistics  
Number of 
observations Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
loan loss reserves to gross loans 1468 8.216 11.837 0.011 98.151
loan loss provisions to gross loans 1459 0.168 2.216 0.000 74.873
net charge-offs to equity 377 3.407 7.324 0.001 85.366
net interbank assets to total assets 1989 0.020 0.268 -2.602 0.924
retail deposits to loans 1973 1.573 1.299 0.000 9.989
size 2092 1287 2831 1 29700
equity to total assets 2092 0.139 0.153 -0.319 1.000
 
Note: Loan loss reserves to gross loans are computed as (loan loss reserves/gross loans). Loan loss provisions to 
gross loans are computed as (loan loss provisions/gross loans). Net-charge-offs to equity are defined as (net 
charge-offs/equity). Net interbank assets to total assets is equal to (interbank assets – interbank liabilities)/total 
assets. Retail deposits to loans is equal to (total deposits – interbank deposits)/loans. Size is equal to total asset 
in million USD. Equity to total assets is (equity/total assets). 
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope  
 
 
 23 
Table 5: Interbank position and bank risk  
Panel data instrumental variable estimation: net interbank assets to total assets are instrumented by the 
ratio of retail deposits to loans  
LLR LLP NCO
net interbank asset/total assets 4.859 *** 4.823 *** 5.124
1.153 0.960 3.321
size -3.276 *** -2.538 *** -3.783 **
0.513 0.620 1.499
size2 0.125 *** 0.084 *** 0.112 *
0.020 0.024 0.058
equity/total assets -0.049 *** -0.042 *** -0.045 *
0.010 0.008 0.025
foreign -0.322 ** -0.494 *** -0.646 **
0.137 0.145 0.276
net interbank assets_large banks 0.328 -0.697 -0.249
0.318 0.464 1.115
net interbank assets_small banks -0.274 -0.360 -1.015
0.265 0.342 0.939
inflation 0.000 0.078 0.038
0.044 0.062 0.204
per capita GDP 0.146 0.811 *** -0.977 *
0.122 0.257 0.516
GDP growth -4.037 ** -5.564 * 0.149
1.966 2.889 5.894
economic freedom 0.524 ** 0.831 ** 0.971
0.212 0.342 0.646
constant 21.192 *** 5.199 20.008 *
3.759 5.157 11.725
number of observations 1129 1132 284
R-squared 0.110 0.494 0.667
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Interbank position and bank risk: alternative instruments 
a. Panel data instrumental variable estimation: net interbank assets to total assets are instrumented by the 
ratio of lagged retail deposits to lagged loans  
LLR LLP NCO
net interbank asset/total assets 5.776 * 3.182 ** 22.388
3.370 1.458 21.189
size -3.634 *** -2.570 *** -4.791
0.819 0.699 3.727
size2 0.138 *** 0.087 *** 0.150
0.030 0.026 0.144
equity/total assets -0.054 ** -0.029 *** -0.153
0.026 0.011 0.141
foreign -0.299 -0.571 *** -0.178
0.217 0.134 0.831
net interbank assets_large banks 0.093 -0.642 -0.406
0.421 0.473 2.529
net interbank assets_small banks -0.352 -0.022 -3.743
0.541 0.380 3.862
inflation 0.025 0.067 0.282
0.050 0.066 0.506
per capita GDP 0.198 0.883 *** -0.921
0.134 0.251 0.999
GDP growth -3.775 -6.533 ** 4.657
2.350 2.872 14.802
economic freedom 0.419 0.361 2.108
0.232 0.335 1.754
constant 23.616 *** 6.062 25.042
6.015 5.471 26.843
number of observations 1043 1037 272
R-squared 0.101 0.625 0.3
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively 
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b. Panel data instrumental variable estimation: net interbank assets to total assets are instrumented by the 
ratio of retail deposits to loans and the ratio of lagged retail deposits to lagged loans*  
LLR LLP NCO
net interbank asset/total assets 5.100 *** 4.785 *** 4.781 **
1.269 1.028 2.501
size -3.473 *** -2.604 *** -3.112 **
0.581 0.745 1.391
size2 0.130 *** 0.086 *** 0.089 *
0.022 0.028 0.053
equity/total assets -0.049 *** -0.044 *** -0.031 *
0.010 0.009 0.019
foreign -0.291 * -0.508 *** -0.625 **
0.155 0.164 0.247
net interbank assets_large banks 0.144 -0.705 -0.706
0.317 0.482 1.377
net interbank assets_small banks -0.239 -0.171 -0.782
0.260 0.347 0.938
inflation 0.020 0.001 -0.014
0.044 0.001 0.209
per capita GDP 0.197 0.863 *** -0.969 *
0.131 0.258 0.519
GDP growth -4.690 ** -6.247 ** 0.099
1.861 2.977 6.690
economic freedom 0.456 ** 0.439 1.121
0.208 0.346 0.686
constant 22.571 *** 6.732 14.197
4.132 5.792 11.190
number of observations 1043 1037 272
R-squared 0.112 0.584 0.731
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively 
* Overidentification restriction tests are passed for all three regression specifications 
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c. Panel data instrumental variable estimation: net interbank assets to total assets are instrumented by the 
ratio of retail deposit to loans, net interbank assets of large banks (nia_lb), net interbank assets of small 
banks (nia_sb) and the interactions nia_sb*(deposits/loans) and nia_lb*(deposits/loans)* 
 
LLR LLP NCO
net interbank asset/total assets 3.230 *** 4.024 *** 2.801 *
0.599 0.759 1.554
size -2.951 *** -2.090 *** -3.614 **
0.403 0.589 1.511
size2 0.111 *** 0.067 *** 0.103 *
0.016 0.023 0.058
equity/total assets -0.035 *** -0.038 *** -0.037 *
0.006 0.007 0.021
foreign -0.338 *** -0.531 *** -0.678 **
0.127 0.150 0.283
inflation -0.010 0.069 0.000
0.034 0.057 0.185
per capita GDP 0.086 0.846 *** -0.896 *
0.113 0.236 0.485
GDP growth -5.019 *** -5.917 ** -0.273
1.479 2.507 5.422
economic freedom 0.547 *** 0.737 ** 0.751
0.169 0.314 0.590
constant 19.515 *** 2.191 18.881
2.947 4.810 11.631
number of observations 1129 1132 284
R-squared 0.149 0.548 0.731
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively 
* Overidentification restriction tests are passed for all but the LLP regression specifications 
 
 
 
